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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment examines the compatibility of the Stockholm Con-
vention on Persistent Organic Pollutants with parties' WTO obligations
under the GAT[ Agreement.' The Stockholm Convention represents a
broad-based attempt to regulate persistent organic pollutants (POPs),
some of the most damaging chemicals to the environment and human
health. The commitments that parties to the Stockholm Convention have
undertaken to control POPs may implicate international trade commit-
ments. Hopefully the discussion in this Comment may also be relevant to
other multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), especially those
involving trade measures.
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School, May 2005; M.A., University of Chicago;
B.A., Macalester College. I am grateful to Professor Robert Howse for his help with my re-
search and to the Journal for its help in publishing this Comment. Mistakes and omissions are
mine.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
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This Comment begins with a brief overview of the Stockholm Con-
vention, followed by four possible ways the Convention could be
implemented. It then considers obligations under the GATT in light of
the Convention and these possible implementations. GATT Article III-
the national treatment requirement-presents the first area of concern, in
that the Stockholm Convention may require parties to treat like products
differently. GATT Article XI-a prohibition on quantitative restric-
tions-is also relevant even though members are unlikely to implement
the Convention in a manner that implicates this article. Finally, GAT
Article XX-general exceptions to GATI obligations-may assist par-
ties in arguing that implementation of the Stockholm Convention
qualifies as permissible protection of natural resources or human health.
Both the specific provisions and the chapeau, or the introductory para-
graph to GATT Article XX, are relevant to these arguments.
To date, no WTO-based challenges have been brought against the
implementation of an MEA. A number of environmental treaties, how-
ever, contain trade measures that are often critical to addressing the harm
concerned (for instance, the Montreal Protocol, CITES, and the Basel
Convention).2 Thus, the susceptibility of MEAs to challenges from the
WTO regime is an important issue both for environmental law and inter-
national trade law.
II. THE STOCKHOLM CONVENTION ON PERSISTENT
ORGANIC POLLUTANTS
A. Introduction
The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants entered
into force on May 17, 2004.' Its primary obligations relate to POPs,
which are long-lived, highly-mobile, toxic chemicals often found in pes-
ticides and industrial chemicals and products. PCBs and DDT are two
high-profile examples of POPs. These chemicals are harmful even in low
doses, they bio-accumulate, and they present a significant transboundary
problem, as they migrate easily. This mobility undermines domestic poli-
cies targeting them, necessitating a global approach to controlling POPs.
While the Convention contains a number of provisions that deal with the
2. See WTO Comm. on Trade and Env't, Note by the Secretariat: Matrix on Trade
Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements, WT/CTE/W/160/
Rev.2 (Apr. 25, 2003).
3. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M.
532 (entered into force May 17, 2004) [hereinafter Stockholm Convention].
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problem in more nuanced ways,4 Article 3 provides the central controls
of the regime by requiring the prohibition or restriction of pollutants in-
cluded in the annexes.
The Convention lists chemicals to be eliminated in Annex A and
those to be restricted in Annex B. It prohibits both the production and
use of Annex A chemicals and permits importation of these chemicals
only for environmentally sound disposal (ESD).5 Similarly, taking prin-
ciples of prior informed consent into account, the Convention permits
export only for ESD.6 Specific exemptions are available and override
certain production, use, import, and export limits. A party may import a
chemical only if it has a specific exemption for that chemical.8 Exporta-
tion of Annex A chemicals for purposes other than ESD is only
permissible between parties that both have taken specific exemptions' or
between an exempted party and a certified nonparty.' °
The production and use of Annex B chemicals are severely restricted
but not completely prohibited. Currently, the only chemical listed in An-
nex B is DDT, but the Convention includes provisions (as with Annex A)
for adding chemicals to this category. Again, importing or exporting An-
nex B pollutants is only permitted for ESD." Specific exemptions for
Annex B chemicals operate in the same way as for Annex A chemicals.
Annex B also permits use of the chemicals in line with acceptable pur-
pose guidelines.
Specific exemptions are temporary waivers to the above obligations
that are available on a chemical-by-chemical basis.' 2 Acceptable purpose
exceptions, which seem to operate as permanent versions of specific
4. The Stockholm Convention contains a number of provisions relating to intention-
ally and unintentionally produced chemicals, stockpiles and wastes, newly identified
chemicals with POP-like characteristics, technical assistance, and the promotion of POP sub-
stitutes. Many of these provisions present challenging WTO-related questions beyond the
scope of this Comment.
5. Stockholm Convention, supra note 3, art. 3.1(a)(i). See generally id. art. 6.1(d)
(defining ESD).
6. Id. art. 3.2(b). Export for ESD is permitted with or without a specific exemption.
See id. arts. 3.2(b)(i), 3.2(c).
7. See id. art. 3.2(b)(ii) (regarding production and use of specific chemicals).
8. Id. art. 3.2(a)(ii), Annex A, Part I.
9. Id. art. 3.2(b)(ii).
10. Id. Prior to exporting to nonparties, the importing state must certify that it is com-
mitted to protecting human health and the environment and that it will comply with the
Convention in certain ways. See id. arts. 3.2(b)(i)-(iii).
11. Id. arts. 3.2(a)(i), 3.2(b).
12. Specific exemptions are listed in Annex A and Annex B. To utilize these exemp-
tions, a state may register upon becoming a party. Id. art. 4.3. Unless an extension is granted,
all specific exemptions expire five years after the date the Convention entered into force, on
May 17, 2009. Id. art. 4.4.
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exemptions, are available for Annex B chemicals. 3 They permit the
production and use, import, and export of Annex B chemicals with the
same restrictions as those imposed on specific exemptions.'
4
B. Implementation of Stockholm Convention Obligations
A WTO member cannot directly challenge an MEA; instead it must
challenge a member's domestic implementation of the agreement. As the
Stockholm Convention permits parties some degree of latitude in im-
plementing their obligations, for ease of analysis this Comment presents
four possible implementation regimes, progressing from exacting to re-
laxed implementation of the Convention.
[1] A party may implement its obligations robustly. The party
bans the production, use, import, and export of Stockholm
Convention chemicals (SCCs) without exception-no specific
exemptions or acceptable purposes are permitted.
[2] A party may implement its obligations strictly but allow ex-
ceptions for DDT. Here, the party bans the production, use,
import, and export of SCCs but allows specific exemptions or
acceptable purpose uses for DDT, presumably for fighting
mosquitoes and malaria.
[3] A party may allow specific exemptions and acceptable pur-
pose uses for pesticides unless effective non-POP-based
substitutes are equally available. This permits the party to
balance current and long-term human health and environ-
mental concerns against immediate human needs (such as
nutrition and food production) and economic needs (such as
development, competitiveness concerns, or cash crop produc-
tion) by allowing specific exemptions and acceptable purpose
uses for pesticides. Developing states would be most likely to
implement this option.
[4] A party may implement option [3] in light of less pressing
health and developmental concerns. This would most likely
be done in the developed world, where immediate human
needs are not as urgent and the scope of available and effec-
tive POP substitutes is therefore much broader. This approach
13. Both the production and use of DDT is to be eliminated except for use by parties
who have notified the Secretariat of their intention to use it as disease vector control per WHO
guidelines. Id. Annex B, Part II.
14. Id. Annex B, Part I (regarding production and use); id. art. 3.2(a)(ii) (regarding
importation); id. art. 3.2(b)(ii) (regarding exportation of Annex B chemicals).
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allows numerous specific exemptions, though domestic eco-
nomic concerns may motivate these exceptions.
III. WTO ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
When implementing the Stockholm Convention, a party must con-
sider GATT Articles III and XI.V '5 If a measure implementing the
Convention focuses on the particular product as a product, then Article
III will apply. As Article XI measures almost always violate members'
GATT obligations-and as the policy goals relevant to the Convention
may generally be met via Article III measures-I assume members will
avoid Article XI measures. Ultimately, GATT Article XX may justify
implementation in the face of challenges under Articles III and XI.
B. GA7T Article III
Article III codifies the principle of national treatment. 6 The Appel-
late Body has noted that the "general principle" of Article III is to ensure
that domestic measures are not applied so as to protect domestic produc-
tion. 7 In particular, Article 111:4 calls for equality of competitive
conditions for domestic products and imported "like products."'" This
does not protect a given market share or even access to a market; it sim-
ply aims at the maintenance of equality of competitive conditions.' 9
15. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) is not discussed here as it has
been interpreted infrequently and is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, that is not
to say that the TBT is not relevant to the Stockholm Convention; given that it regulates mem-
bers' use of technical regulations, it would be highly relevant to any implementation of the
Convention. Such analysis is simply too hypothetical, and too specialized in its own right, to
be treated here. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I A, Multilateral Agreements on
Trade in Goods-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994).
16. GAIT, supra note 1, art. III.
17. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, 97, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) (quoting Appellate
Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 14, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DSIO/AB/R,
WT/DS1 1/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996)). See also Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra, at
17.
18. GATT, supra note 1, art. 111:4.
19. Report of the Panel, Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act,
5.9, L/5504, (July 25, 1983), GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140 (1984). See also WTO
Comm. on Trade and Env't, Note by the Secretariat: Taxes and Charges for Environmental
Purposes-Border Tax Adjustments, XLII, WT/CTE/W/47 (May 2, 1997) [hereinafter Bor-
der Tax Note by the Secretariat] ("The purpose of [Article II] is to establish certain
competitive conditions for imported products in relation to domestic products; it is not to
protect expectations on export volumes.").
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For Article 1II:4 to apply, the products at issue must be "like" and the
treatment of the foreign product must be "no less favourable" than that
afforded the domestic product.20 "Treatment no less favourable" requires
equality of treatment, or nondiscriminatory treatment, rather than strict
identity of treatment.2 '
Whether products are "like" must be considered on a case-by-case
basis.22 As a framework for analyzing likeness, the criteria from the Bor-
der Tax Adjustment Report of 1970 have been adopted: "the properties,
nature and quality of the product"; "the end-uses of the products"; "con-
.• 23
sumers' tastes and habits"; and the products' tariff classifications. As
the ordinary meaning of "likeness" involves some ambiguity, the Appel-
late Body has considered Article 11I:4's context-Article Il 1-and
noted that "likeness" is fundamentally concerned with the competitive
relationship between the products at issue.24 Thus, the Border Tax Ad-
20. Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 17, $ 100 (reiterating the bipar-
tite nature of Article 1I1:4).
21. See Report of the Panel, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
5.11, U6439 (Jan. 16, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1990).
[T]he mere fact that imported products are subject under [the measure at issue] to
legal provisions that are different from those applying to products of national origin
is in itself not conclusive in establishing inconsistency with Article 111:4. In such
cases, it has to be assessed whether or not such differences in the legal provisions
applicable do or do not accord to imported products less favourable treatment.
Given that the underlying objective is to guarantee equality of treatment, it is in-
cumbent on the contracting party applying differential treatment to show that, in
spite of such differences, the no less favourable treatment standard of Article III is
met.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, $ 137, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS 169/AB/R (Dec. I1, 2000).
This standard ties back into Article II1:1 's general principle of prohibiting protectionist meas-
ures: less favorable treatment of like imported products translates to protection of like
domestic products. See Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 17, 1 100. In deter-
mining whether there is less favorable treatment, the focus is on how, if at all, a measure that
fails to treat like products equally alters the conditions of competition. See Appellate Body
Report, Korea-Beef, supra, 137.
22. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra note 17, at 20-21 (noting that
the scope of like products will expand or contract based on the particular provision at issue).
23. Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 17, 85. See also GATT General
Council, Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, $[ 18, L/3464 (Nov. 20,
1970) [hereinafter BTA 1970 Report]. The last element, tariff classification, was not part of the
BTA 1970 Report criteria, but it has been widely used in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement
process. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 17, $ 101 n.74 (noting
that tariff classification was not a Border Tax Adjustments criteria, but has been included sub-
sequently and listed other reports utilizing that criteria). While the Appellate Body has noted
that the use of these criteria is not textually required such an approach to like product appears
to be a de facto standard. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 17,
U 32, 86 (arguing that the purpose or effect of the regulatory distinction should determine the
likeness of products rejected in favor of the BTA 1970 Report criteria).
24. Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 17, $ 99.
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justment Report criteria are to be examined in light of how they "influ-
ence the competitive relationship between products in the marketplace.'"25
End uses and consumer preferences address the presence or absence of a
competitive relationship and are particularly significant when the prod-
ucts at issue are not physically similar. 6 Health considerations may be
considered under the rubric of physical properties and consumers' pref-
27
erences.
The like product analysis under Article 111:4 is the crucial considera-
tion for the Stockholm Convention. If SCCs and their substitutes are like
products, banning SCCs would drastically alter the competitive relation-
ship between these products. An SCC producer or consumer will have a
strong complaint if she can demonstrate likeness because implementa-
tion of the Convention may treat imported products more or less
favorably.28 Likeness will depend upon a number of empirical issues,
including facts about SCC substitutes, health concerns, and the relation-
ship between the individual SCCs and their substitutes. Given the factual
nature of the like product analysis, it is difficult to predict specific out-
comes.
Generally speaking, SCCs and SCC substitutes can initially be pre-
sumed to be dissimilar. The particular chemicals are not likely to be
physically identical; otherwise the substitutes would also be POPs and
presumably would be banned. SCC substitutes can also be presumed to
be less threatening to human health, making them less similar in terms of
"the properties, nature and quality of the product." Further, if the end
uses of the substitutes happen to be distinct, if they perform less effec-
tively, or if consumers perceive the chemicals differently, a finding of
likeness will prove more difficult.
Cutting against these considerations is the fact that consumers in de-
veloping states may prioritize the short-term needs these chemicals
address-mosquito and malaria eradication with DDT, agricultural im-
peratives, or developmental needs-over long-term health concerns.
Here, this greater tolerance of the health risks associated with SCCs
25. Id. 1 114. Each of the adopted criteria may be assessed with respect to this influ-
ence.
26. See id. 117-118. By requiring a higher showing of likeness in cases where the
products are not physically identical, the Appellate Body has taken a narrow view of "like
products" that tightly correlates with physical similarity. See id. 136.
27. See id. 1114, 122.
28. It is unclear how the particular facts of the implementation will alter this analysis. It
may be that the more exceptions granted, the fewer conflicts there will be, as permitting use or
production of some SCCs (the most "like" their substitutes) will blunt like product challenges.
Alternatively, it may be that a greater number of exceptions will exacerbate such challenges
since, if the use or production of one SCC is allowed, it is not clear why others are not permit-
ted.
Fall 200611
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makes it more probable that SCC substitutes will be found to be like
SCCs.
A state implementing policy [2] could make a strong argument that
DDT is not like its substitutes: it is by far the most effective anti-
mosquito agent and it causes among the worst health and environmental
harms. Regarding policy [3], the analysis is likely to be chemical-by-
chemical. The differences between SCCs and SCC substitutes, however,
will be much narrower and consumers may not differentiate between
them the way they do with DDT and its substitutes. Regarding [4], con-
sumers in developed states may be more likely to discriminate between
SCCs and SCC substitutes, making a finding of likeness less probable. 9
To the extent specific SCCs are found to be like their substitutes,
policy choices [3] and [4] would likely be violations of Article 111:4. It is
less likely that DDT and its substitutes would be found like products,
given its nearly unique mosquito controlling properties. Policy choice [1]
seems relatively immune from challenge under Article 111:4 in that, as
long as the measure affords treatment "no less favourable," a state has
met Article 111:4's requirements.
C. GATTArticle XI
Article XI eliminates members' ability to limit or ban imports and
exports through quotas, licensing regimes, or other related means.3 It
states that no restrictions or prohibitions, excepting taxes and duties,
shall be enacted on imported products or products to be exported.3' Such
measures are generally obvious, forcing members to argue either that
they are internal measures-and thus governed by Article III-rather
than border measures or quantitative restrictions, or that the measure is
justified under Article XX. Measures that directly address the product or
its characteristics, such as those at issue in EC-Asbestos, will avoid be-
ing found in violation of Article XI, while prohibitive measures not
concerned with the product qua product will not be exempted from Arti-
cle XI analysis.32
29. It is interesting that a finding of like products would be more difficult under policy
[4] than [3], as this appears contrary to the thrust of Article XX; the policy reasons for [3] are
more in line with Article XX(b). Policy [4] appears more like protectionism, as there are rea-
sonably available policy alternatives (policies closer to [1] than [4]).
30. This article is part of the GATT's policy of tariffication-the transformation of
trade barriers from a variety of administrative controls into tariffs. This policy promotes trans-
parency and ease of negotiation by revealing barriers to trade to members. See, e.g., Border
Tax Note by the Secretariat, supra note 19, 5.
31. GATT supra note 1, art. XI: 1. Article XI:2 lists several exceptions, none of which
are relevant in this setting.
32. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, Unites States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
5.14, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) (unadopted) ("Ar-
[Vol. 28:157
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Again, to the extent they are able, members will likely wish to avoid
Article XI measures as they are generally GATT-illegal. 3 The differences
between measures [1] through [4] are unlikely to change the analysis
under Article XI; its only focus is on the way members implement their
policy choices-border measures versus internal measures. The article is
less concerned with the particulars of that policy choice, such as the
presence or absence of a given exception.
As EC-Asbestos demonstrates, a member may achieve the same
policy result, halting the risk from a particular source, through internal
measures rather than through border measures. Thus, quantitative meas-
ures, to the extent they are adopted, should be converted to internal
measures to avoid Article XI scrutiny. For example, the import and ex-
port restrictions in [1] could be implemented via a domestic production
and use ban or a prohibitive tax.
IV. GATT ARTICLE XX ANALYSIS
Article XX permits exceptions to members' obligations based on a
number of public policy justifications.34 Most relevant here are Articles
XX(g)--exceptions related to the conservation of natural resources-and
XX(b)-exceptions necessary to protect plant, animal, and human life
and health. Members often invoke these provisions, and thus several pan-
els and the Appellate Body have interpreted them. Still, claims under
Article XX are rarely upheld; this is especially true for claims invoking
the demanding "necessary" standard in Article XX(b). To date, EC-
Asbestos is the only case that has upheld a broad restriction on trade un-
der Article XX(b). Significantly, the measure at issue there imposed
limits on trade for health reasons, just as the measures parties could
adopt under the Stockholm Convention might impose health-based re-
strictions.
ticle III covers only measures affecting products as such."). As the U.S. measure focused on
the fishing method rather than the fish themselves, it did not meet Article III's requirement
that such internal measures be "applied to" products.
33. Members may be neither willing nor able to avoid Article XI: the member may not
have the capacity to avoid border measures (internal controls would be more expensive or
unenforceable); there may be domestic policy constraints; the member may believe it will not
be challenged (as it is a powerful actor or as the domestic market for imports is quite small);
or it may wish to make a statement about POPs (a "clean hands" policy).
34. Other exceptions are available, for example: Article XIX (safeguard measures);
Article XXI (national security exceptions); and Article XXV(5) (providing a temporary waiver
of certain obligations).
Fall 20061
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A member challenging a measure must first establish that there is a
GATT violation.35 Analysis begins with the article allegedly violated and,
only if a violation is found, does it continue to consider the Article XX
claim." The specific exception claimed is considered first, and then the
chapeau.37 Analysis under the specific provision focuses on the "general
design" of the measure as opposed to its "application," which is the fo-
cus under the chapeau.38 Provisional justification under one of the
specific provisions is not terribly burdensome for a well designed meas-
ure. Analysis under the chapeau, however, is more difficult and less
certain, in part because it is a more searching analysis and, relatedly, be-
cause the focus is more on the application of a measure than merely a
facial review.39
A. GATTArticle XX(g)
Article XX(g) excepts measures "relating to the conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources" from GATT obligations. Analysis under
Article XX(g) proceeds through three elements: whether the measure
concerns exhaustible natural resources, whether the measure "relat[es] to
the conservation" of these resources, and whether the measure is made
effective in conjunction with domestic restrictions. The primary diffi-
culty in this context is shoehorning an implementation of the Stockholm
Convention within the scope of the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources.
The latter two requirements of Article XX(g) should not be difficult
to satisfy. A GAT Panel interpreted "relating to" to require that the
measure be "primarily aimed at" conservation while later decisions ap-
35. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, [ 8.79, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
36. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, U.S.-Section 337, supra note 21, 5.9.
37. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, 6.20, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996).
38. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Shrimp and
Certain Shrimp Products, 116, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). It is of concern that at
times the Appellate Body appears to relabel certain structural aspects of a measure as "appli-
cations" rather than "general design," and thus analyze the measure under the much more
demanding, and less clear, chapeau. See, e.g., id. 183-184 (analyzing apparent "design"
elements such as procedural protections, availability of appeal, and lack of a written decision,
as "applications" and finding that the United States' procedural shortcomings constituted a
violation of the chapeau). Even though the measure contested in this case was "unjustifiable,"
the flexibility that allows the Appellate Body to judge the structural elements of a measure
under the chapeau's application analysis is of concern. Id. q 184.
39. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, 22-23, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
40. Report of the Panel, Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring
and Salmon, 4.6, L6268 (Nov. 20, 1987), GAIT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 99 (1989).
[Vol. 28:157
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pear to have relaxed this somewhat.4 ' That a measure is not per se a con-is• 42
servation measure is not dispositive nor is there any "effects test"
• 41
regarding the measure's actual impact on resource use or conservation.
The difficulty in applying Article XX(g) to an implementation of the
Stockholm Convention is that it does not cover measures protecting the
"environment" at large. The measure at issue must relate to the protec-
tion of a specific exhaustible natural resource. While this provision has
been read quite broadly," it is not at all clear that the Stockholm Conven-
tion's general concern for the environment will suffice.
One way for a state to enlist the protection of Article XX(g) would
be to focus on the harm POPs present to a specific resource. For exam-
ple, states could act to protect fish stocks or other important animal
resources whose survival POPs threaten. Or, parties could argue that
POPs threaten a specific nonliving natural resource such as fresh water.
A difficulty under such an approach is that the Convention as a whole
imposes a variety of requirements that are not directly related to conser-
vation of a particular natural resource, and therefore it may be too broad
to appropriately "relate to" conservation. 6
41. Appellate Body Report, Korea-Beef, supra note 21, 161 n.104 (noting that meas-
ures indicating a "substantial relationship"-a close and genuine relationship of ends and
means--or that are "reasonably related" to conservation have been upheld). The discussions in
the Appellate Body following Canada Salmon increasingly focused on the relationship be-
tween the policy and the measure at issue rather than solely focusing on the primary aim of
the measure. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 38, 1 136.
42. Report of the Panel, Canada-Salmon, supra note 40, 4.7.
43. Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 39, at 21.
44. Report of the Panel, Canada-Salmon, supra note 40, 1 4.4. See also Report of the
Panel, United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, 4.9,
L/5198 (Dec. 22, 1981), GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (1983); Report of the Panel, U.S.-
Tuna, supra note 32, 5.20; Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 38, 134;
Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 39, at 8 (noting that clean air is an ex-
haustible natural resource).
45. The health threat posed by POPs must threaten the population as a whole; a threat
to individuals within a population is unlikely to be sufficient for protective measures under
Article XX(g). The ordinary meaning of "resources" focuses on the species rather than the
individual, and a reading that applied Article XX(g) to individuals would invade the scope of
Article XX(b), contrary to principles of treaty interpretation. Also, the Appellate Body's dis-
cussion of "exhaustible natural resources" in U.S.-Shrimp (where it explicitly extended this
provision to encompass living resources) focused on the species rather than the individual.
Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 38, 128.
An alternative would be to pursue protection under Article XX(b), which permits
measures for the protection of "human, animal, or plant life or health... " This would per-
haps permit measures to protect a narrower range of plants or animals, but it would require
meeting the "necessary" standard, which is a heavier burden.
46. For example, prior informed consent standards do not have a readily apparent direct
relationship with resource conservation; or, the implementation of the Convention may ad-
dress chemicals that do not implicate the protected resource.
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It is not clear that the Convention is appropriately focused to fit within
Article XX(g), as it appears to focus on broader threats to the environment
generally and to specific threats to human health. None of the above policy
implementations appear sufficiently related to natural resources to find
justification under Article XX(g), as the connection between implementa-
tion of the Convention and conservation will likely prove insufficient, even
under the more flexible Korea-Beef standard; implementation cannot
reasonably be said to enjoy a "close and genuine relationship" with
achieving conservation goals.47
B. GAlTArticle XX(b)
Given the difficulty of justifying a measure under Article XX(g),
members would likely need to defend implementation of the Stockholm
Convention under Article XX(b). Article XX(b) has two requirements: a
measure must focus on protecting human, animal, or plant life or health,
and it must be necessary to achieve the member's elected level of protec-
48tion. Demonstrating that measures implementing the Stockholm
Convention aim to protect either human or animal life or health should
be relatively straightforward, as a wealth of scientific data confirms the
danger of POPs. 49 The difficulty will be to demonstrate the necessity of
measures adopted under the Convention.
Under the GATT, "necessary" depends on the absence of reasonably
available alternatives that could achieve the elected level of protection. If
a reasonably available, GATT-consistent-or, barring that, a reasonably
available, less GATT-inconsistent-alternative exists that would achieve
the same level of protection, the measure at issue cannot be said to be
"necessary." This analysis is closely tied to the policy goal of the meas-
ure, thereby giving members control over the scope of reasonably
available alternatives. Members are free to determine the level of protec-
tion they desire. 0 The focus is on the means by which a member
47. A focus on the environment, rather than a specific resource, could be treated more
broadly under the TBT Agreement, which permits measures to protect the environment.
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 15, art. 2.2. This is an additional reason
to conduct an analysis under that Agreement.
48. See, e.g., Panel Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 37, 6.20.
49. Claims that a measure's goal is the protection of human health are generally suc-
cessful. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes, 73, DSIO/R (Oct. 5, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991);
Panel Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 35, I 8.194; Panel Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra
note 37,J 6.21.
50. See Appellate Body Report, EC Asbestos, supra note 17, 168.
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implements its chosen level of protection, not the choice of ends,5' and
so the chosen level of protection defines the scope of the reasonably
available alternatives. Thus, in an effort to insulate a measure from chal-
lenge, members may wish to adopt aggressive measures.
The meaning of "reasonably available" is context-dependent and has
been defined as not "unreasonably burdensome, financially or techni-
cally";52 something less than "impossible";5 3 and something more than
mere administrative difficulty. The standard will vary with a member's
level of development." It will also depend on a weighing of factors re-
lated to the policy goal, how the policy helps effect that goal, and the
importance of the goal. In a way, this restates the point that the higher
the level of protection, the easier it is to demonstrate necessity.
6
C. The Chapeau
The opening paragraph of Article XX, referred to as the chapeau,
enunciates three additional standards for reviewing a measure at issue.
Measures must not be applied so as to constitute (1) arbitrary discrimina-
tion, (2) unjustifiable discrimination, or (3) a disguised restriction on
international trade.57 Analysis under the chapeau is searching; the Appel-
late Body has repeatedly found that provisionally justified measures
constitute violations of the chapeau.
Analysis under the chapeau is not clear, but fundamentally it ap-
pears to be an application of the principle of good faith, limiting
overreaching by members. In U.S.-Gasoline, the Appellate Body util-
ized a "necessary"-like analysis to strike down a measure that was an
51. See Report of the Panel, U.S.-Section 337, supra note 21, 5.26. (noting that the
issue is not the chosen level of protection, but rather how to achieve that level in a manner
most consistent with the GATI).
52. Report of the Panel, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, 665, WT/DS 161/R, WT/DS 169/R (July 31, 2000).
53. Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 17, 169 (describing the Cana-
dian argument).
54. Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 39, at 25-26 (describing the
U.S. argument).
55. See Panel Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 35, 1 8.207 ("[R]easonably available
measure[s] must be assessed in the light of the economic and administrative realities facing
the Member but also by taking into account the fact that the State must provide itself with the
means of implementing its policies").
56. See Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 17, 172 ("'[Tjhe more
vital or important [the] common interests or values' pursued, the easier it would be to accept
as 'necessary' measures designed to achieve those ends.'" (quoting Appellate Body Report,
Korea-Beef, supra note 21, 11163, 166)).
57. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX, introductory paragraph. Further, arbitrary and unjusti-
fiable discrimination are to be judged only between states "where the same conditions
prevail." Id.
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egregious violation of Article III.51 In U.S.-Shrimp, the Appellate
Body instead characterized its review as a balancing test, restating the
purpose of the chapeau as an application of the principle of good faith:
members should not abuse the exercise of their rights.59 It described
Article XX exceptions as "limited and conditional exception[s]. ... ."60
Balancing is a poorly chosen term-in reality the Appellate Body is
defining, in a case-by-case manner, the extent to which exceptions are
available to a member. But the Appellate Body has not presented or ap-
plied its standards with any degree of clarity.6' Stated generally, the
outcomes of U.S.-Gasoline and U.S.-Shrimp appear correct: members
should apply measures transparently and protect due process rights;
needless or unfair distinctions between domestic and foreign producers
should not be allowed; and members should not operate based on infor-
mal knowledge or apply measures, even those which are facially neutral,
so as to discriminate.
However, the Appellate Body's method of analysis is troubling, and
the standards it provides for judging future measures are unclear. Even
granting that the purpose of the chapeau-ensuring a good faith imple-
mentation of the available exceptions-is by design extremely broad, the
lack of clear standards is of concern. While the above general remarks
will hold for cases where the measures are clearly inconsistent with the
GATT, it is unclear how the analysis will operate in closer cases, such as
those possible under the Stockholm Convention.
58. The Appellate Body rested its conclusion that the measure at issue violated the
chapeau on language from the Panel decision, which found that the measure was not justified
under Article XX(g) as there were "reasonably available" GATT-compliant alternatives. Ap-
pellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 39, at 28-29. The Appellate Body argued
that the measure was such a glaring violation of Article III that it was purposefully discrimina-
tory and therefore was not entitled to protection under Article XX. Id.
59. Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 38, 1 156.
[The chapeau] embodies the recognition ... of the need to maintain a balance of
rights and obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of
the exceptions of Article XX ... on the one hand, and the substantive rights of the
other Members under the GATT 1994, on the other hand.... [T]hus a balance must
be struck between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX
and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other Members.
Id.
60. Id. 157.
61. Further, there is no reason to believe that the Appellate Body is institutionally well-
suited to conduct a balancing of incommensurate polices and values. This point is made by
Steve Charnovitz as part of a review of Article XX cases. Steve Chamovitz, The Law of Envi-
ronmental "PPMs" in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 59,
101 (2002).
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D. Application to the Stockholm Convention
Again, it does not appear that any of the above implementations are
sufficiently related to natural resources to find justification under Article
XX(g). Such an argument appears tenuous in light of the Convention's
focus on human health and the breadth of implementation it requires.
Even if a resource could be found that the Convention could be intended
to conserve, the connection between the implementation of the Conven-
tion and conservation will likely prove insufficient. Even under the more
flexible Korea-Beef standard, implementation cannot reasonably be
said to enjoy a "close and genuine relationship" with achieving conser-
vation goals.
For Article XX(b), none of the possible Stockholm Convention im-
plementation choices would face difficulty in satisfying the requirement
that they aim to protect human health and life. The "necessary" require-
ment is the more difficult prong of the analysis. By approaching the
question in terms of the policy goal (according to the "reasonably avail-
able alternative" analysis above), a member could compellingly argue
that implementations [1] and [2] are, in fact, necessary. Apart from the
particular substance at issue, the argument for either of these should not
substantially differ from that in EC- Asbestos: members are banning
substances that are extremely harmful to human health and implement-
ing a near zero-tolerance for the existence of such harms. That policy
choice [2] permits DDT should not be problematic because the interpre-
tation of "reasonably available alternatives" takes into account the
member's context, which should encompass the need for balancing
61health concerns with DDT use.
Options [3] and especially [4] are more problematic: their policy
goals are mixed, and a broad range of alternative policies could likely
achieve the same lower level of protection. While the status of a member
as a developing country may help under [3], developed countries would
have more difficulty justifying policy [4], as their health needs are less
pressing and they can access a greater range of alternatives.
Options [3] and [4] also face some difficulty under the balancing ap-
proach articulated in Korea-Beef The mixed nature of these policies,
which lowers the level of protection to which they aspire, opens them to
greater challenge under this analysis: it is more difficult for a member to
62. While the use of DDT indicates a willingness to accept some health harms, it
should not undercut a member's ability to regulate other SCCs. DDT has been uniquely suc-
cessful in the fight against malaria, which kills roughly a million people annually. Developing
states have fewer resources, and so DDT substitutes may not be available, and administrative
resources may be strained, making absolute measures easier to enforce than more permissive
regulations.
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claim that its policy contributes to the protection of human health. On
this point, [1] and [2] are again relatively strong because the value they
protect (human health) is of paramount importance, 63 and again, given
the zero-tolerance for continued exposure to POPs, a strict policy is cru-
cial to achieving their goal.
It is far more difficult to predict the outcome of an analysis under the
chapeau. To the extent good faith is assumed and extended to the appli-
cation of these measures, members should be on solid footing.64 The
impact of the differences between policy implementations is unclear, as
the application of a measure is at issue, rather than the details of its par-
ticular design. Moreover, to the extent that panels and the Appellate
Body retain elements of the "necessary"-like analysis of U.S.-Gasoline,
members that have been successful under Article XX(b) will enjoy a
strong position.
This outcome, at a general level, seems desirable from an environ-
mental perspective. States should have the ability to enact strict measures
and tailor their policies to their circumstances and levels of develop-
ment.6 ' Thus, the sense that choices [1] and [2] are most permissible
under the chapeau, while choices [3] and [4] are less permissible, seems
appropriate. Again, the details of an implementation regime may greatly
influence the outcome, and the WTO's newfound deference to members'
responses to serious health threats may, of course, evaporate, but mem-
bers may at least make a strong argument here.
An alternative argument for justification under the chapeau or under
the "necessary" prong in Article XX(b) would emphasize that members
implement Stockholm Convention measures pursuant to obligations un-
der an MEA, thus creating a presumption of validity.66 Given the broad
scope of necessity within Article XX(b), the fact that the measures are
part of an MEA should work to the advantage of parties to the Conven-
tion. The existence of an MEA could be a statement of the importance of
63. This would of course be true of [3] and [4] (though an argument could be advanced
against [4] on this score, especially if it is clear that economic considerations were important
factors). The issue with this argument, however, is that the policy does not clearly help protect
this value.
64. At least, they should be able to avoid the now obvious mistakes of the United States in
U.S.-Gasoline and U.S.-Shrimp. Members must take care to act neutrally between trading
partners, and it is important to utilize transparent and formalized procedures, rather than in-
formal or ad hoc processes.
65. For example, even though DDT is environmentally objectionable, there are very
good reasons for its utilization in countries afflicted by malaria and constrained in their re-
sponse to this threat by development levels.
66. There are complex issues here (regarding the interaction of WTO and general pub-
lic international law, or the interaction between party and nonparty obligations and how they
operate under the WTO) that are crucial to the outcome of this argument but are far beyond
the scope of this Comment.
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the policy goal, thus making a finding of necessity and good faith easier.
The presence of an MEA underscores the importance of the policy goal;
it indicates the importance of the measure to achieving that goal; and it
demonstrates the lack of discriminatory motives (and thus objectionable
limits on trade) in implementing such measures. Finally, the lack of a
multilateral solution played a crucial role in U.S.-Shrimp, and this ar-
gument also comports with the Appellate Body's willingness to interpret
(at least in limited cases) WTO obligations in light of MEAs (for in-
stance, its interpretation of "natural resources" in U.S.-Shrimp), as well
as with the trend toward reading Article XX broadly.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the transboundary nature of POPs, an international solution is
required and trade measures are a vital part of this approach. In analyz-
ing the Stockholm Convention, the focus of this Comment was on GATT
Articles III and XX. Whether SCCs and their substitutes are "like prod-
ucts" will depend on the specific chemicals and the needs of customers,
weighing physical similarity and consumer preferences. The success of
Article XX arguments may well rest on how aggressively members
choose to pursue a policy of eliminating POPs. An aggressive policy
goal, combined with the importance of protecting the environment and
human health, should help members prove their measures are at least
provisionally justified, and perhaps survive scrutiny under the chapeau.
Trade measures are often at the core of MEAs, and so it is vital to
implement measures that can coexist and meet both the requirements of
international trade law and the needs and goals of international environ-
mental law. The success of the Stockholm Convention could be an
indication of broader possibilities and help elucidate possible paths for
other MEAs. The Convention is an important MEA addressing a goal
that would be difficult or impossible to address solely at a domestic
level. The Convention could be implemented in a GATT-compliant man-
ner, and it represents a negotiated, multilateral solution. If a treaty such
as this cannot survive trade-based challenges, that certainly does not
bode well for the ability of future agreements to address environmental
problems through trade measures.
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